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Abstract
We consider an open to trade two-country model with two vertically di¤erentiated goods
and relative preferences in consumption. These preferences are such that consumers obtain
satisfaction from their own consumption in relation to the consumption of the others. Product
di¤erentiation is along an environmental quality dimension and countries are asymmetric in
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nd that, when relative preferences
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1 Introduction
"There is strong agreement across the EU about the ethics of environmentally-
friendly products: 95% of respondents agreed that using environmentally friendly prod-
ucts is the right thing to do, 91% agreed that buying environmentally-friendly products
sets a good example and 80% agreed that their family and friends would think it was a
good thing if they used environmentally-friendly products." Eurobarometer, 2013 (italics
added by the authors).
Since the famous treatise by Veblen (1899), conspicuous practices intended as means to satisfy
craving for power or social approval have been largely observed among consumers. While, for a
long time, luxurious cars, expensive wine and apparel have been considered the key drivers for
high social status, more recent approaches have identied further conspicuous goods for a relative
position in the social community. For example, the environmental degradation of the planet has
generated increasing concerns among people who are currently aware of the devastating e¤ects
of global pollution on public health. Protecting environment is viewed as a way to preserve the
future of human beings and to care for relatives, peers and friends. As a natural by-product of this
awareness, environmentally friendly products have been introduced in the set of conspicuous goods:
green consumption is nowadays a byword for good citizenship and green products are conspicuous
means to get the status of good citizens.
The conspicuous content of green consumption opens the door to two considerations.
First, the social reward for environmental protection shall be wider the more conspicuous are
the goods. Whenever the environmental quality gap between a green variant and an ordinary
product is not extremely relevant, the contribution to environmental protection, and thus to the
social community, coming from green consumption is not signicant. In this circumstance, green
consumers do not distinguish themselves from dirty buyers and thus do not obtain the visible status
of socially worthy citizens. It is as if the products ranking along the environmental quality ladder
would determine the consumers ranking along the social ladder. In 2007, the New York Times
cited the main reasons why Toyota Prius owners bought their hybrid cars. It emerged that the
buyers had "only a basic understanding of environmental issues or the ecological benets of HEVs
(hybrid electric vehicles)" and they purchased only because it shows the world that its owner
cares(He¤ner et al 2007, p. 409).
Second, the environmental concern determining the conspicuous dimension of green good is
mainly country specic. Individuals living in the same neighborhood or the same region and sus-
tained by a same level of average income may share a set of shared values, behaviours and beliefs
(Dietz et al, 2005; Steg and de Groot, 2012) that determine a common consciousness about the en-
vironmental issues as well as about the socially appreciated consumption attitudes/choices (Litina
et al., 2016).1 Nonetheless, countries are more and more involved in international agreements which
liberalize trade and reduce the costs of export/import. As a consequence of this trade liberalization
1Ultimately, these shared values provide social mechanisms which sanction any deviation from the set of appreci-
ated attitudes and reward a compliant behavior. Additionally, individual perceptions about the causes of pollution
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process, consumers living in di¤erent country, with heterogenous income, culture and beliefs, get
familiar with goods that they would not know in absence of trade.2
These considerations generate some questions that we try to give an answer in this paper. How
the conspicuous dimension of green consumption a¤ect the equilibrium conguration of the market?
Countries di¤er not only in terms of culture and values but also in terms of income levels. Does
the worldwide distribution of environmental consciousness play a role in curbing global emissions?
What is the contribution, if any, of trade liberalization to the environment when taking into account
that green goods can be perceived as conspicuous products?
We dene a partial equilibrium model with two asymmetric countries as in Cabrales and Motta
(2001) and two vertically di¤erentiated goods where the green good is the high quality good.3
Consumers in each country are heterogenous with respect to their willingness to pay for quality.
Countries are asymmetric in terms of average income. The richer country produces a clean good
while the latter, the poorer, specializes in the production of a brown good.4 Each country is
populated by a rm. Each rm exports its product thereby facing an iceberg cost, which is lower
the more liberalized trade is. Introducing this cost in the model enables to consider how the
protability to produce green versus brown goods changes with the process of trade liberalization.
When dening consumption behaviour in a country, we do not depart from the well-known con-
cept of homo economicus, a rational and self-interested agent who traditionally maximizes his/her
utility. Still, we reconcile this traditional approach with the idea that human beings are (at least
partially) a¤ected by social interaction and driven in their behaviour by some country specic so-
cial values. Thus, when consuming conspicuous goods, they obtain social benets or incur social
stigma, behind the material needs which are typically met. In line with this, we assume that goods
are valued along two dimensions: their intrinsic quality and their social component. The former,
in accordance with the traditional model of vertical di¤erentiation à la Mussa and Rosen, is such
that the absolute quality of a variant determines its utility. So, the green good is the high quality
variant along the quality ladder since it dominates the competing and low-quality alternative from
an environmental viewpoint. The latter induces consumers to value a variant depending on its rel-
ative environmental quality, namely the quality gap between the variant itself and the alternative
one: this gap determines the social value of the good and thus xes the status of her buyer along
a social ladder. We formalize this social component through relative preferences and, borrowing
some ingredients from Ben Elhadj and Tarola (2015), we nest them in a vertically di¤erentiated
seem quite di¤erent among people living in rich and poor countries as reported by The Health of the Planet Survey
(Dunlap and Metig, 1995). People living in rich countries show much more awareness about the role of their individ-
ual green versus brown consumption on pollution in the country of residence: feeling responsible w.r.t. environment
belongs to a set of values arising after essential needs have been satised.
2For a dynamic analysis, with vertically di¤erentiated goods, see Gabszewicz et al, 2017, who study how consump-
tion habits evolve when countries open to trade.
3A good survey of the industrial organisation models nested with international trade is Krugman (1989).
4This assumption is in line with the traditional view of a North-South model of production where dirty productions
are relegated in less developed countries, the green ones being rather in the more advanced groups of nations (see for
instance Copeland and Taylor 1994 and Fajgebaum et al, 2011).
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market.5
Accordingly, under the assumption of country-specic relative preferences, we characterize the
equilibrium conguration of the oligopoly. In particular, we rst describe the role of relative
preferences by comparing this equilibrium with a baseline where relative preferences are absent.
Second, under country-specic relative preferences, we study the e¤ect of trade liberalization on
the equilibrium conguration thereby evaluating the role of trade liberalization.
We consider di¤erent scenarios. After presenting the related literature (Section 2), we provide
the presentation of the model in Section 3 and the description of the setup without relative pref-
erences in Section 4. In Section 5, we characterize the scenario where consumers in both countries
display relative preferences. Then, in Section 6 we assume that relative preferences emerge only in
one country. We conclude in Section 7.
We nd that relative preferences in both countries never reduce the optimal quantity of goods
and the corresponding trade exchanges w.r.t. the baseline. Moreover, the twofold goal of increasing
the production of green good at expense of the brown one and curbing global emissions is reached
whenever trade liberalization is su¢ ciently signicant. This shows that while some results could
be true in a closed economy, they can cease to be valid in a more realistic world of open trading
areas.
More relevant, increasing trade liberalization can reduce global emissions only in the case when
both areas attribute a social content to green consumption. By contrast, trade liberalization is
always environment detrimental when relative preferences are observed in the poorer country.
2 Related literature
Our paper locates in the existing literature that analyses conspicuous consumption and the corre-
sponding role played by the social content of preferences. More specically, our modelling strategy
is inspired by the empirical literature on conspicuous green consumption and social status. Sexton
and Sexton (2014) test for the presence of a conspicuous conservation e¤ect in vehicle purchase
decisions and estimate the willingness to pay for the green halo generated by signaling green
type. They nd that "green" cars are more valuable in communities with a strong green ethos than
in communities with greater heterogeneity in attitudes toward the environment. Welsch and Küh-
ling (2009) using a panel data for Germany nd evidence that the green consumption of reference
persons plays a signicant role on whether individuals install residential solar energy equipment or
subscribe to green-electricity programs. It seems indeed that when buying environmentally-friendly
products agents feel to set a good example for their peers and that their family and friends would
5Relative preferences capture the idea that consumers obtains satisfaction from their own consumption in relation
to the consumption of the others. Specic relative preferences have been considered for example by Akerlof (1997).
In his paper, the satisfaction of a consumer increases with the di¤erence between the personal status and others
status. Alexopoulos and Sapp (2006) and Riechmann (2006) analyze relative preferences from the point of view of
rms. They are also labeled other-regarding preferences.
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appreciate back if they used environmentally-friendly product.6 Alpizar and Gsottbauer (2015)
present a framed eld experiment on the role of reputation as a driver of a recycling behaviour.
They nd that reputation plays a role in promoting green e¤orts. Interestingly, the willingness to
avoid shame generated by a bad behaviour is stronger than the one to acquire gratitude or good
reputation.
We believe that this phenomenon can be modelled in a parsimonious way using related prefer-
ences to study market outcomes, as we did in this paper.7
Our analysis complements the theoretical literature on social norms and pro-environmental be-
havior (see e.g., Stern, 2000; Brekke et al., 2003) thereby contributing to the debate on the impact of
environmentally friendly behavior on market equilibrium (Conrad, 2005; Lombardini and Riipinen,
2005, Eriksson, 2004; Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzs, 2009; Moraga-Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero,
2002; Nyborg et al., 2006; Rodriguez-Ibeas 2007). These papers show that consumers are partially
driven in their consumption choice by some social norms which dene rules of interactions among
individuals (Hage et al. 2009; Ostrom, 2000; Carlsson et al., 2010; Deltas et al., 2013; Abbott et
al. 2013; Mantovani et al. 2017). These norms are enforced by interiorized feelings and/or cultural
beliefs and, when concerned with environmental issues, state that green consumption is a habit
displayed by good citizens. Accordingly, while buying clean products, people feel to comply with a
norm of worthy citizenship and, thus, obtain a social/psychological benet of social approval and
self-esteem. Along the same rationale, they su¤er a social stigma when purchasing dirty products.8
From a methodology point of view, the existing literature has already treated open economy
versions of the vertically di¤erentiated duopoly framework. For instance, Motta and Thisse (1993)
extend the vertical di¤erentiation model to two countries with two rms each in order to analyse
the e¤ects of environmental quality standards in autarky and free trade. Herguera et al. (2000)
study the e¤ect of quantity restrictions on the quality choice in a vertically di¤erentiated model.
At the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to use relative preferences, along a quality dimension,
to capture the social content of green consumption in an open economy version of the vertical
di¤erentiated duopoly.
Last, even though we use a very di¤erent setting, our paper is related to existing literature
on (i) quality and international trade and (ii) pollution and trade liberalization. Quality and
6Torgler and García-Valiµnas (2007) in a di¤erent but close perspective stress the role of trust and membership
in promoting pro-environmental behaviour. See also Van der Bergh (2008) for an empirical analysis on potential
psychological determinants of a pro-environmental behavior.
7Consipicous consumption that translates into peer comparison appears also in other consumption decisions rather
than environmental-friendly goods. For instance, Fliessbach et al. (2007), and Dohmen et al. (2011), using brain
images, nd evidence that the well-being of individuals depends not only on their income but also by the comparison
of their income to that of others. Peer comparison a¤ects retirements plans (Beshears et al. 2015), nancial decisions
(Bursztyn et al. 2014 ) or housing choices (Schunemann and Trimborn, 2017).
8 In line with this argument, Owen and Videras (2006, 2007) and Videras et al. (2012) argue that individuals
who are more willing to behave according to civic and cultural norms and have more social ties are also more willing
to protect a public good, namely, the natural environment, while Brekke et al. (2003, 2010) and Czajkowski et al.
(2015) show that self image is central to recycling behavior. Cecere at al. (2014) claim that altruistic motives induce
people to buy green products so that green behaviour is not always reinforced by social norms.
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trade literature has considerably expanded since the seminal paper by Linder (1961) showing that
product quality matters in the trade patterns among trading partners (Hummels and Klenow,
2005; Verhoogen, 2008; Khandelwal, 2010; Hallak and Schott, 2011; Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011;
Fajgebaum et al, 2011). Existing papers have analysed how trade liberalization a¤ects quality
choice when countries are asymmetric (Cabrales and Motta, 2001) or the role of income e¤ects in
the quality choice in presence of international trade with non homothetic preferences (Picard and
Tampieri, 2016).
The literature over the role trade plays in determining environmental outcomes is large and
often with contradicting results. The pollution haven hypothesis suggests that relatively low income
countries will be made dirtier with trade. Whereas, the factor endowment theory, suggests that
trade will induce the dirty capital-intensive processes to locate to the relatively capital abundant
rich countries. Empirical ndings are also mixed (for instance Antweiler et al, 2001; Copeland and
Taylor 2003).
At the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to bring together key factors as the social content
of consumption, product quality and trade in a unique theoretical setup. More precisely, we bring
a setting that uses relative preferences along a quality dimension to capture the social content of
green consumption in an international trade model with the purpose of analysing the e¤ect of trade
liberalization on prices, rmsprots and pollution.
3 The Model
Consider a two-country model with two vertically di¤erentiated goods along an environmental
quality dimension. Each country is populated by a single rm. We label Green and Brown each
country and the corresponding rm within the country. The Green (resp. Brown) rm produces
the high (resp. low) environmental variant qG (resp. qB).9 The range of quality is in the interval
q; q

where q is the highest quality level that is technologically feasible and q > 0 is the lowest
one. Each rm can serve both countries. When serving the foreign market, it incurs iceberg trade
costs  ; 1    0. Trade costs are related not only to the geographical distance between countries
but also and mainly to cultural barriers, tari¤s and administrative costs. This distance determines
a gap between the quantity produced to serve the foreign market and the one actually arrived at
destination. More specically, from the rms viewpoint, this distance creates a gap between the
quantity produced to serve the foreign market and the one generating prots. When  is closer to
1, trade costs are relatively low and the quantity produced to serve the foreign market is similar to
the one determining prots. When  is close to 0, then trade barriers erode a signicant amount
of quantity targeted to the foreign market with a negative e¤ect on prots, ceteris paribus.
As for the demand side, in each country, consumers are characterized by their willingness to pay
9 In line with the traditional approach in vertical di¤erentiation (Mussa and Rosen, 1978 and Gabszewicz and
Thisse, 1979), we interprete qi as the quality of variant i. We assume that it is exogenously given. Of course,
there exist constributions which keep this traditional intepretation but endogeneize the variant. See for example
Rodriguez-Ibeas (2007) and Andre et al. (2009).
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for environmental quality indexed by , uniformly distributed over the interval [0;i] ; i = G;B:
Parameter i denotes the highest willingness to pay for quality in country i. We assume that
G > B: Thus, the average willingness to pay in country G is higher than in country B: consumers
in the two countries di¤er in their taste for quality and this di¤erence can rest on di¤erences in
income (as in Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979). Accordingly, the richer country produces the green
good, while the poorer country produces the brown one.10 This is a similar assumption to Flam and
Helpman (1987) or Murphy and Shleifer (1997) who argue that the high quality good is produced
in the richer countries whereas the low quality good is produced in the poorer ones.11
4 The baseline scenario: absence of relative preferences
We rst consider a closed economy scenario where, in absence of trade, a monopoly in country i
only serves the domestic market i; i = G;B: Consumers display the same preferences with respect
to variants, so that their indirect utility function Ui () writes as
Ui () =
8><>:
qG   pG if she buys G
qB   pB if she buys B
0 otherwise
(1)
In this case, the indi¤erent consumer between buying variant i and not buying at all is ^i =
pi
qi
with i = G;B: Then, it is immediate that, at equilibrium, price and quantity pAi and q
A
i are:
pAG =
1
2
qGG and pAB =
1
2
qBB
xAG =
1
2
G and xAB =
1
2
B;
where the subscript A stands for autarky. Finally, we dene pollution damage as:
EA = EAG + E
A
B ;
with EG = xi;  2 (0; 1) and EB = xB.12 Accordingly, polluting emissions in country G and
country B are, respectively:
10Of course, one could also assume that the richer country has the smaller population size, while the poorer country
has the larger size. In this case, as claried by Cabrales and Motta (2001), the main ndings depend on whether the
former force, namely the population size driver, prevails over the latter, namely the income driver.
Although the scope of their analysis is di¤erent from ours, since they investigate the e¤ects of trade liberalization
on product choice in a two-country model, Cabrales and Motta (2001) discuss the role of countriesasymmetry in
terms of population size and average income in open economies.
11We can solve the model assuming exactly the opposite: brown good produced in the or richer country and green
good produced in the poorer country. These calculations can be made available upon request.
12For simplicity, we postulate a linear positive relationship between the amount of the nal good produced and the
quantity of emissions as in Sanin and Zanaj (2011). A more complex correlation between production and emissions
renders rather complex any comparison of total emissions across scenarios.
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EAG = 
G
2
and EAB =
B
2
or
EA = EAG + E
A
B =
G + B
2
.
In the case of open economies the market structure is a duopoly with rms competing in an
international economy. The corresponding demand function of each rm can be written as follows
xG(pG; pB) = (B   pG   pB
qG   qB ) +

G   pG   pB
qG   qB

xB(pG; pB) =
pG   pB
qG   qB  
pB
qB
+ (
pG   pB
qG   qB  
pB
qB
)
Maximizing prot i = pixi(pi; pj); i; j = B;G, i 6= j; of rm i yields the candidate equilibrium
prices
pG = (qG   qB) (G+B)2qG(4qG qB)(+1)
pB = (qG   qB) (G+B)qB(4qG qB)(+1) :
The corresponding demands at equilibrium write as
xG =
2(G + B)qG
4qG   qB and x

B =
(G + B)qG
4qG   qB :
In this setting, the typical e¤ects of trade on the equilibrium conguration emerge so that the
equilibrium prices of the variants decrease and the corresponding demands raise as trade gets more
and more liberalized.
Thus, at equilibrium, pollution damage writes as:
EG = 
2(G + B)qG
4qG   qB ; E

B =
(G + B)qG
4qG   qB or
E =
qG (G + B) (2+ 1)
(4qG   qB) :
It is worth noticing that
EAG   EG =  
1
2

GqB + 4BqG
4qG   qB < 0
EAB   EB =
1
2
4BqG  BqB   2GqG   2BqG
4qG   qB < 0 i¤ qG < qG;
where qG  12B qB(2 )B G : So, emissions coming from the clean rm are higher under trade
than in the case of closed economy, whatever the income asymmetry between countries. Rather,
emissions from the brown rm are higher under trade if and only if qG is su¢ ciently low, namely
qG < qG: The rationale for this nding is that the green rm always takes advantage in terms of
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quantity from openness of markets: the benet of o¤ering a high quality variant in a new market
(market expansion e¤ect) overcompensates the possible reduction determined by competing against
a rival in an open duopoly rather than being a monopoly in a closed economy (competition e¤ect).
The dirty rm instead raises its optimal quantity if its environmental quality is su¢ ciently similar
to the green rival (i.e. qG relatively low), since only in this circumstance the reduction induced by
competition against a high-quality rival is overcompensated by the market expansion benet.
5 Relative preferences in both countries
We assume in this section that consumers in both countries display relative preferences. Accord-
ingly, they benet from a social/psychological premium if they buy the higher quality variant, or
su¤er a penalty if they buy the dirty product. We characterize the equilibrium conguration and
consider the e¤ect of trade liberalization on it.
Formally, the indirect utility function in country i, with i = G;B writes as follows:
Ui () =
8><>:
qB   pB   i(qG   qB) if she buys B
qG   pG + i(qG   qB) if she buys G
0 otherwise
(2)
In the above formulation, we add to the traditional utility function a social component i(qG  qB)
capturing the existence of relative preferences. This term denes the social benet (or the social
punishment) which is obtained (or su¤ered) by the consumer when purchasing the green (or the
brown) variant of the good. Ceteris paribus, this social component increases with the gap between
environmental qualities: the higher the environmental quality of the green variant with respect
to the dirty product, the stronger the social rewards or the ercer the social punishment for the
consumers. The intensity of the relative preferences is given by the parameter i: When relative
preferences are present in both countries, it is assumed G > B and thus in the richer country
G; the social drivers attached to the environmental quality are more signicant than those in the
poorer country B: This is in line with the idea that green norms are interiorized after the basic
needs have been satised.13 Thus, the indi¤erent consumer between buying the green variant and
the brown one in country G and country B; G and B; respectively write as
G(pG; pB) =
pG   pB   2G(qG   qB)
qG   qB
B(pG; pB) =
pG   pB   2B(qG   qB)
qG   qB ;
while the indi¤erent consumer between buying the low quality variant and not buying at all, namely
~G; ~B in country G and country B; write as
~G(pB) =
pB+G(qG qB)
qB
and ~B(pB) =
pB + B(qG   qB)
qB
.
13See on this Ben-Elhadj and Tarola (2015).
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Finally ^G(pG) =
pG   G(qG   qB)
qG
and ^B(pG) =
pG   B(qG   qB)
qG
, with ^B(pG) > 0; i¤
pG > B(qG   qB); represent the indi¤erent consumer between buying the high quality green
variant and not buying at all in country G and country B, respectively. In this framework, the
demand functions faced by rms G and B write, respectively, as:
xG(pG; pB) = (B  K) + G   k
xB(pG; pB) = K   pB + B (qG   qB)
qB
+ (k   pB + G (qG   qB)
qB
)
where K =
pG   pB   2B (qG   qB)
(qG   qB) and k =
pG   pB   2G (qG   qB)
(qG   qB) : Given the prot function
i(pi; pj) = pixi(pi; pj), i; j = B;G, i 6= j; the pair of equilibrium prices is easily found
pG =
(qG qB)((G+B+2(G+B))2qG (B+G)(qG+qB))
(4qG qB)(+1)
pB =
(qG qB)((G+B+2(G+B))qB 2(qG+qB)(G+B))
(4qG qB)(+1) :
The corresponding demands at equilibrium are then
xG =
2(G+B+2(G+B))qG (B+G)(qG+qB)
4qG qB
xB = qG
((G+B+2(G+B))qB 2(qG+qB)(G+B))
qB(4qG qB) :
Notice that pG > 0 and x

G > 0 always hold whereas p

B and x

B are strictly positive i¤ B 
B =
2(B+G)(qB+qG) qB(G+2(G+B))
qB
: Since the social penalty reduces the price of the brown
good, for its price to be positive, the average income of the poorer country has to be su¢ ciently
high. Finally, we nd emissions at equilibrium
EG =
2(G+B+2(G+B))qG (B+G)(qG+qB)
4qG qB
EB = qG
((G+B2(G+B))qB 2(qG+qB)(G+B))
qB(4qG qB) :
Denoting by  = BqB+BqG GqBBqB GqB GqG the value of  such that E

B () = E

B(); we observe that
Proposition 1 Relative preferences raise the equilibrium price and quantity of the green variant
w.r.t. the baseline, whatever the level of trade liberalization. By contrast, they reduce the equilibrium
price and the corresponding quantity of the brown good w.r.t. the baseline, when the international
trade is su¢ ciently liberalized ( > ). In this case, global emissions can decrease.
Proof. The e¤ects of relative preferences on prices and quantity immediately derive from direct
comparison of the expressions. As far as the emissions is concerned, rst notice that (EG + E

B ) 
(EG + E

B) =
( B G)2q2G+(2G 2B B+2B+4G 2G+4B G)qGqB (B+G)q2B
qB
< 0 i¤
 >  =
 (2Bq2G+Bq2B+2BqBqG 2GqBqG+BqBqG 4GqBqG)
2Gq
2
G+Gq
2
B 2BqBqG+2GqBqG 4BqBqG+GqBqG
: Since  7  ; then (EG + EB )  
(EG + E

B) < 0 whenever  > max[ ;  ]:
In the case when  >  ; our nding on the equilibrium price of the brown variant is in line
with that emerging in Ben-Elhadj and Tarola (2015) where rms produce and sell in their home
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market and exports are not contemplated. Indeed, when trade liberalization is very signicant, it
is as if the two areas would collapse to a single market. In this circumstance, one can isolate two
drivers of equilibrium prices: a price competition driver and a social driver. The former driver,
which is typically observed in a vertically di¤erentiated model, is such that the larger the quality
gap between variants, the less erce the price competition in the market and thus the higher the
equilibrium prices. The latter is rather linked to the social component of consumption so that the
social benet of buying green raises the equilibrium price of the green variant to the extent that
the social punishment reduces the equilibrium price of the competing and dirty product. Notice
that
Remark  < 0 , qG > qG with qG =

G
B
  1

qG:
Clearly, the condition  >  is always met when  < 0; namely when the green variant has
a very high environmental quality (qG > qG). Interestingly, the threshold value qG increases in
G and decreases in B: Accordingly, the lower (resp. the higher) the environmental concern in
the richer (resp. poorer) country, the larger the set of qG   values such that  < 0: In this case,
the price competition driver moves upward the price of the brown good, while the social driver
emphasizes the social frustration of buying the brown good thereby reducing its corresponding
price. This latter force prevails over the former so that the equilibrium price of the brown product
under relative preferences is lower than in the baseline scenario.
It is worth noticing that, when the international trade is su¢ ciently liberalized, the existence of
relative preferences reduces global emissions. Hence, a social content to green and brown products
and a signicant trade liberalization benet environmentally virtuous rms and curb global emis-
sions. This no longer holds when trade liberalization is not pronounced. With high trade costs, a
widespread green awareness does not contribute to reduce emissions.
To summarize, while relative preferences can reduce emissions of the brown country, they al-
ways raise the equilibrium quantity produced in the green country and thus, ceteris paribus, the
corresponding emissions. Hence, the clean country becomes dirtier, whatever the level of trade
liberalization, while the brown counterpart becomes cleaner if and only if international trade is
su¢ ciently liberalized. Still, when these preferences emerge in a setting where trade is intense,
pollution of the brown country decreases to such an extent to counterbalance the raise in emissions
of the clean one.
We investigate now the role of trade liberalization on the equilibrium conguration.
Let us denote G =
(2BqG+4BqG)
qB+qG
and 
0
G =
(BqB+2BqB)
2qB+2qG
; with 
0
G < G; and
 = qGqB
 2GqG+BqB+2BqB 2GqB
GqB 2BqG 4BqG+GqG :
Then,
Proposition 2 Trade liberalization
(i) decreases the quantity sold by each rm i¤ the social component in country G is strong
(G > G): In this case, global emissions unambiguously decrease.
(ii) increases the quantity sold by rm G while it reduces the quantity of rm B i¤ the social
component in country G is moderate (
0
G < G < G). In this case, global emissions decrease
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whenever the high environmentally friendly variant is su¢ ciently green ( < min[; 1]).
(iii) Finally, it increases the quantity sold by each rm with a raise in global emissions i¤ the
social driver of consumption in country G is weak (G < 
0
G).
Proof. As far as the e¤ect of trade liberalization on equilibrium quantity, from standard com-
putations we nd that@x

G
@ =
2BqG+4BqG GqG GqB
4qG qB R 0 , G 7 G 
(2BqG+4BqG)
qB+qG
;
@xB
@ =
qG
BqB+2BqB 2GqG 2GqB
qB(4qG qB) R 0, G 7 
0
G  (BqB+2BqB)2qB+2qG ; G 
0
G =
1
2 (B + 2B)
4qG qB
qB+qG
> 0:
As far as emissions, in the extreme case of high and low social environmental awareness, the result
is straightforward. In the intermediate case, we observe @(E

G +E

G )
@ = a
2BqG+4BqG GqG GqB
(4qG qB) +
qG
BqB+2BqB 2GqG 2GqB
qB(4qG qB) =
(2BqBqG Gq2B+4BqBqG GqBqG)a+(BqBqG 2Gq2G+2BqBqG 2GqBqG)
qB(4qG qB)
with the numerator being negative i¤  < a = (
 2Gq2G+BqBqG+2BqBqG 2GqBqG)
Gq
2
B 2BqBqG 4BqBqG+GqBqG
: Moreover  > 1
i¤ B < B =
(Gq2B+2Gq
2
G 6BqBqG+3GqBqG)
3qBqG
:
It is worth noticing that whenever relative preferences are extremely signicant, both the clean
and the dirty countries become cleaner with trade. Nowadays, with people being increasingly aware
of environmental issues and the e¤ort made for liberalizing trade, we can reasonable guess that this
eco-friendly path will be likely to emerge.
Proposition 3 Trade liberalization reduces both equilibrium prices.
Proof. Straightforward for direct comparison.
This nding sounds surprising: trade liberalization can reduce the equilibrium quantities while
decreasing their price, with a positive e¤ect on environment. In particular, these e¤ects emerge
when the intensity of social preferences in country G is relevant. Traditionally liberalizing the
trade determines a reduction of the equilibrium prices with a corresponding increase of the traded
quantity. The rationale for our result can be captured as follows. Due to trade liberalization,
the equilibrium price of both variants decreases. Since the social component in country G driven
by G(qG   qB) is very signicant, the price of the green variant decreases proportionally less than
the price of the brown good. This reduction in prices has a cross-e¤ect: the quantity of the
variant i reduces as a consequence of the price reduction of the competing variant j: Still, the
reduction of xB is less signicant than that of x

G : the high intensity of the social component G in
country G magnies the benet (resp. punishment) of buying the green (resp. dirty) good thereby
restraining the reduction of its price pG while increasing that of the corresponding demand. In
this circumstance, global emissions clearly decrease. This environmental benet can still hold when
the market share of the green rm raise. In particular, this is the case if the green variant has
extremely low emissions per unit of production ( < min[; 1]):
The traditional e¤ects determined by trade liberalization, with reduction in prices and increases
in demand, are observed when the social component gets weaker and weaker.
Last, G increases with qG while 
0
G decreases with qG: Accordingly, the higher the value of qG;
the larger the set of parameters such that 
0
G < B < G holds. So, a product innovation increasing
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the environmental quality of the green good makes the green rm better o¤, while making worse
o¤ the brown rival, ceteris paribus.
6 Relative preferences in one country
We assume now that relative preferences are present in only one of two countries. First, we consider
the scenario where consumers in the poorer country have relative preferences, those in the richer
country having the traditional utility function. More specically, in this case we assume G = 0:
Then, we move to the case in which consumerspreferences and rms production are aligned: the
green (resp. brown) rm is located where consumers displays more (resp. less) sensitivity for the
environment. Hence, in this case, we assume B = 0. In both these scenarios the role of trade cost
is crucial.
6.1 Relative preferences in country B
In this scenario, we assume that relative preferences emerge in country B where the more pollutant
production activity is located. The pair of equilibrium prices pi; i = G;B writes as
pG = (qG   qB) (G+B+2B)2qG B(qG+qB)(4qG qB)(+1)
pB = (qG   qB) (G+B+2B)qB 2B(qG+qB)(4qG qB)(+1)
with the corresponding demand at equilibrium being:
xG =
(G+B+2B)2qG B(qG+qB)
4qG qB
xB = qG
(G+B+2B)qB 2B(qG+qB)
qB(4qG qB) :
The candidate equilibrium price pB is positive i¤
G >  with  =
2B(qG+qB) 2BqB
qB
 B :
Since  > , then pB > 0 , pG > 0: The price of the green variant pG is positive if and
only if the richer country G has a su¢ ciently high average income, namely G >  where 
= B(qB+qG) 4BqG2qG   B with   0 for B  12qG (B (qB + qG)  4BqG). When relative
preferences are present in both countries, the positivity of the price of the green variant was met,
regardless of the average income in country G: This is due to the fact that now the social reward
from buying the green variant is weaker than in that setting. As immediate consequence, the
green price is lower under relative preferences in country B than under relative preferences in both
countries.
At this equilibrium conguration, pollution damage writes as
EG = 
(G+B+2B)2qG B(qG+qB)
4qG qB
EB = qG
(G+B+2B)qB 2B(qG+qB)
qB(4qG qB) :
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Then, denoting by _ = qB+qG4qG we nd that
Proposition 4 Compared with the baseline scenario, relative preferences only in the brown market
(i) reduce the equilibrium price and the corresponding demand of the brown good; while (ii) raise
both the equilibrium price and demand of the green variant i¤ trade is su¢ ciently liberalized ( > _).
Even when raising the market share of the green rm, they reduce global emissions.
Proof. From direct comparison of the expressions.
Accordingly, when the social component of consumption holds only in the poorer country, the
brown rm is penalized by the existence of relative preferences, regardless of trade costs: the social
penalty su¤ered by consumers when buying the dirty product moves downward its price. Along
the same rationale, the green rm benets from these preferences only under a su¢ ciently high
liberalization: when trade costs are not relevant, the environmental awareness in country B turns
out to be signicant, thereby moving upward the willingness to pay for the green good and thus its
equilibrium price pG.
Nonetheless, it gets higher than in the baseline, namely pG > pG > p

G: Interestingly, these pref-
erences are environment improving. Whatever the trade liberalization, global emissions decrease.
We investigate now the role of trade liberalization on the equilibrium conguration, under
the assumption of relative preferences in countryB: Typically, as a natural consequence of trade
liberalization, equilibrium prices of the traded goods tend to reduce while demand of products to
increase. This phenomenon determines a positive e¤ect on consumers surplus and possibly on
rmsprots if the increase in quantity can countervail the reduction in prices.
Let us dene  = 2GqG 2BqGqB+5qG and ^ =
GqB BqB
4qB+2qG
: We claim the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Trade liberalization
(i) increases (resp. decreases) both prices whenever the intensity of relative preferences is high
(resp. low), namely i¤ B >  (resp. B < ^). For any  > B > ^, it increases the price of the
brown variant and decreases the one of the green rm.
(ii) always increases the quantity produced by both rms and thus it is environment detrimental.
Proof. @pG@ = (qG   qB) BqB+5BqG+2BqG 2GqG(4qG qB)(+1)2 R 0, B R  =
2GqG 2BqG
qB+5qG
@pB
@ = (qG   qB) 4BqB+2BqG+BqB GqB(4qG qB)(+1)2 R 0, B R ^ =
GqB BqB
4qB+2qG
.
with    ^ = (4qG qB)(qB+qG)(G B)(2qB+qG)(qB+5qG) > 0: The e¤ect on global emissions is straightforward.
The rationale underlying the above Proposition can be expressed as follows. When the social
component of consumption is very signicant, trade liberalization benets both rms: the green
producer takes advantage from the social component in country B which moves upward their will-
ingness to pay for the environmentally friendly good and, thus, the equilibrium price of the green
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variant. Since prices are strategic complements, the higher the equilibrium price pG; the higher
the equilibrium price of the competing variant. When the social component is low, the traditional
ndings emerge, with trade liberalization reducing prices and increasing the corresponding traded
quantities. Finally, for intermediate values of the social component, on one hand the social punish-
ment penalizing the dirty product is weak so that the brown rm can get benet from exporting
to the richer country and selling to consumers who disregard the social content of the goods. On
the other hand, the price of the green variant is moved downward by the low willingness to pay of
consumers in country B; for which the social rewards of buying socially worthy goods play a minor
role.
Rather surprisingly, it emerges that when the social component a¤ects consumerspreferences
only in poorer countries where dirty goods are produced, the process of trade liberalization can
favor brown producers, while penalizing green rms.
This e¤ect is never found in the scenario with relative preferences in both countries. In that case,
both equilibrium prices decrease with trade liberalization; further, when the social component is
extremely signicant, the equilibrium quantities decrease as well, with a negative e¤ect on prots of
both producer. Still, when this component is not so relevant, it may happen that the equilibrium
quantity of the green good increase with trade liberalization, while that of the brown product
decreases. When this happens, it may hold that the green producer takes advantage from the
liberalization of the trade, while the brown producer is penalized from it.
Finally, we notice that trade liberalization is always environmental detrimental since it raise
both equilibrium quantities.
6.2 Relative preferences in country G
In this setting with relative preferences arising only in country G, we observe the same qualitative
ndings emerging when relative preferences arise in both countries. For clarity of exposition, we
relegate to the Appendix A the formal details of this scenario. We nd that relative preferences
reduce the price and the quantity of the brown variant at equilibrium w.r.t. the baseline when
the international market is free enough, while raise the equilibrium price and quantity of the green
product, irrespective of trade cost.
Further, in line with the general analysis, we observe that whenever the intensity of relative
preferences is relatively low (resp. high), trade liberalization raises (resp. decreases) the equilibrium
demand of both brown and green goods. For intermediate values of this intensity, the demand of
the green good increases while that of the brown good decreases. Both equilibrium prices decrease
with trade liberalization. Relative preferences reduce global emissions w.r.t. the baseline for a
su¢ ciently high value of  and trade liberalization is unambiguously environmental enhancing
only when relative preferences are weak. Otherwise, for global emissions to decrease with trade
liberalization, the emissions generated from the green product per unit of production have to be
su¢ ciently low.14 Nevertheless, it is interesting to notice that:
14See Appendix C for formal details.
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Proposition 6 Trade liberalization favors the green producer more when consumers in both coun-
tries display relative preferences than in the case when these preferences arise only in country G:
Proof. See Appendix B.
Clearly, the larger the number of countries, in which consumers show relative preferences, the
stronger the incentive for rms to produce green goods in the light of the increasing liberalization
process.
7 A natural extension: quality competition
In our analysis, we have assumed that rms only compete in price, the quality of goods being
given. While this statement represents a natural entry point of the analysis, it could be interesting
to extend the model to the case where rms dene their optimal quality in order to obtain some
intuitions about the role of environmental relative preferences and trade liberalization when quality
is endogenously selected by the rms. To this aim, we simplify the analysis by xing G = B.
Under this assumption, countries no longer di¤er in average income and they present the same
population size.
In this simplied scenario, rst we can prove that the prot function of the green good is
monotonically increasing in qG (see Appendix D). Although this nding comes with no surprise,
absent quality specic production costs, it enables us to conclude that the green rm chooses the
highest possible quality. Whereas for the brown rm, we identify a threshold of G that determine
two intervals.
In the rst, for relatively high levels of intensity of relative preferences; the brown rm chooses
a low quality in order to soften price competition. In the second, for relatively low intensity of
relative preferences, the brown rm chooses to be closer to the green rms quality, because of the
strong loss in market share in presence of relative preferences.
We summarize the above ndings in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 In the case of endogenous quality, the green rm sets it optimal quality at the
highest level, its prot being monotonically increasing in qG: The brown competitor chooses the
optimal quality gap, depending on the intensity of relative preferences. In particular, the optimal
quality qB is set close to qG for a low intensity of relative preferences:
What is the e¤ect of trade liberalization when qualities are endogenous? We observe that while
the threshold value G increases in qG and decreases in qB; the opposite holds for 
0
G; which is
higher, the lower is qG and the higher is qB: Accordingly, when the brown quality is set close to
the green variant, the condition  > G is more easily satised. Hence, in presence of relative
preferences, using the result of the Proposition 2 in point (i), endogenous quality choices enlarges
the set of parameters such that emissions decrease with trade liberalization. Rather, in the case
where the brown rms chooses to be far from the rm in terms of quality, the interval such that
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0
G < G < G enlarges and global emissions can decrease with trade liberalization, as stated in
point (ii) of the same proposition.
8 Conclusions
Status goods are as old as humanity. In the ancient Rome, when plebeians became so rich to
decorate their homes, then the Roman elites installed mosaics in their villas. At the end of the
19th century, Thorstein Veblen noted in The Theory of the Leisure Class the book in which
he coined the phrase conspicuous consumption spending lavishly on expensive but essentially
wasteful goods and services is evidence of wealth and the failure to consume in due quantity
and quality becomes a mark of inferiority and demerit.
In the present paper, we have argued that in the 21st century, the list of status good that serves
to give status among peers has changed considerably including environmentally friendly goods.
These preferences are named environmental relative preferences and their presence may induce
unexpected e¤ects of trade liberalization on the environment.
The main result of our model is that trade liberalization can reduce the equilibrium quantities
while decreasing their price, with a positive e¤ect on the environment (Proposition 2 and 3). This
is a key result in view of the highly intensied international trade relations worldwide during the
last 3 decades. Further, this is a result that can be empirically tested. More specically, a rst
empirically testable result of our model is that (i) global emissions decrease with trade liberalization
if relative preferences are present and thus interiorized by both rich and poor countries. In addition,
(ii) trade liberalization may lead to an increase in prices and in the level of production of brown
goods, if developed and emerging countries show signicant di¤erences in relative preferences. It
follows that we can empirically investigate whether environmental relative preferences are present in
the developing and developed country; as well as, the threshold value of environmental preferences
intensity so as further increasing international trade relations is not detrimental for the environment.
We remain optimistic that relying on the rich databases available nowadays, namely in the
presence of a common set of observables as average income of countries; trade costs measures,
population size; indicators of environmental quality as environmental Performance Index (EPI)
and/or CO2 emissions, we can answer satisfactorily the above questions.
Appendix
Appendix A: Relative preferences in country G
In this section, we provide the details for the scenario in which relative preferences appear in country
G. We nd that the equilibrium prices are given by
pG = (qG   qB) (G+B+2)2qG (qG+qB)(4qG qB)(+1)
pB = (qG   qB) (G+B+2)qB 2(qG+qB)(4qG qB)(+1)
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Notice that pG > 0 always holds while the positivity of the equilibrium price p

B is met i¤B  _B
where _B =
2(qB+qG) qB(2+G)
qB
:
The corresponding equilibrium market shares are then:
xG =
(G + 2 + B)2qG   (qG + qB)
4qG   qB
xB = qG
(G + 2 + B)qB   2(qG + qB)
qB (4qG   qB) :
For the positivity of the market share xB ; the same argument used about p

B applies so that
xB > 0 i¤ B  _B.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 6
From standard computations, @x

G
@ =
BqB 2qB 2qG
qB(4qG qB) R 0 ,  S _ and
@xB
@ =
qB+qG 2BqG
qB 4qG R
0 ,  S : Notice that  < _ < 0G always holds: Accordingly, when  < _ <  < 
0
G; then the
equilibrium demand of the green goods increases with trade liberalization in the general setting
with relative preferences in both countries. Still, it reduces in the particular case where relative
preferences arise only in country G:
Appendix C: Analysis of Emissions
Let EG = 
(G + 2 + B)2qG   (qG + qB)
4qG   qB and E

B = qG
(G + 2 + B)qB   2(qG + qB)
qB (4qG   qB)
be the global emissions coming from rms G and B; respectively in the case when relative prefer-
ences only emerge in county G; so that
EG = 
2(G + B)qG
4qG   qB ; E

B =
(G + B)qG
4qG   qB or
E =
qG (G + B) (2+ 1)
(4qG   qB) :
Then,
E   EG = 
 2qBqG + 2q2G + q2B   4qBqG + 2qBqG + qBqG
qB (qB   4qG) :
Since the denominator is negative, the sign of the above di¤erence depends on the numerator. From
standard algebra, we immediately obtain that 2qBqG+2q2G+q2B 4qBqG+2qBqG+qBqG >
0 i¤  >  = 2qBqG 2+1(qB+qG)(2qG+qB) : Accordingly, we conclude that E
   EG < 0 i¤  >  :
As far as the e¤ect of trade on emissions, we observe that
@xG
@ =
qB+qG 2BqG
qB 4qG < 0 since B > 
@xB
@ = qG
2qB+2qG BqB
qB(qB 4qG) T 0 i¤  S B =
BqB
2qG+2qB
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Appendix D: Endogenous quality choice
As in the standard vertical di¤erentiation model, the choice of prices and qualities can be modelled
as a two-stage game in which in the rst stage rms select the quality of the variant they produce
and, in the second stage, rms select prices.
We reconsider the framework of Section 5 assuming for simplicity G = B = : Following the
same procedure, we obtain the candidate equilibrium prices as
pG =
qG   qB
(4qG   qB) ( + 1)(2qG( +  + 2 (G + B))  (qG + qB)(G + B))
pB =
qG   qB
(4qG   qB) ( + 1) (qB( +  + 2(G + B))  (qG + qB)(2G + 2B))
Positivity of both prices is guarantied when  > max    1qB
qB(2G+2B) (2B+2G)(qB+qG)
+1 ,
namely when the size of the market is su¢ ciently large to let both variants of the goods to be
produced in the market with pG   pB > 0: Demands of rms G and B are then given by
xG =
qG(2 + 2 + 4G + 4B)  (qG + qB)(G + B)
4qG   qB
xB = qG
qB( +  + 2G + 2B)  2(qG + qB)(G + B)
qB (4qG   qB)
Even in the case of the market share, we nd that for the positivity of xG and x

B is satised
for a large overall market size . By plugging demands and prices in equilibrium into the prot
functions, we nd
G(qB; qG) = (qG   qB)
(2qG( +  + 2 (G + B))  (qG + qB)(G + B))2
(4qG   qB)2 ( + 1)
B(qB; qG) = qG (qG   qB)
(qB( +  + 2G + 2B)  2(qG + qB)(G + B))2
qB (4qG   qB)2 ( + 1)
Since both the price and the market share of rm G are higher than those of rm B, prot of the
high quality rm are larger than prot of low quality rm:
Quality Choice stage
 Choice of qG
Taking the derivative of G(qG; qB)with respect to qG; we nd
@G(qB; qG)=@qG = ( + 1) (2qG + (3qG   qB) G) 
qG (2 (4qG   3qB) + G (12qG   5qB)) + (4  G) q
2
B
(4qG   qB)3
which is positively signed for qG > qB and  > G for positivity of prices. It follows that under
country-specic relative preferences, for any given level of the trade costs, the rm producing the
high quality rm selects the highest possible level of quality q:
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 Choice of qB
Taking the derivative of B(qB; qG)with respect to qB; we nd
@B(qB; qG)
@qB
= q2G
 
qB   2BqG + 2GqB   2BqB + qB
 2GqG   2GqB + 2BqB
!
| {z }
positive if prices are positive


0B@  7q
2
B + 8Bq
2
G   14Gq2B + 18Bq2B   7q2B
+8Gq
2
G + 18Gq
2
B   14Bq2B + 4qGqB+
8GqGqB   14BqGqB + 4qGqB   14GqGqB + 8BqGqB
1CA
parabola| {z } in qB
q2B (4qG   qB)3 ( + 1)
The parabola in qB rewrites as
((18G   7  14B)  + (18B   14G   7)) q2B + (3)
(4qG + 8GqG   14BqG + 4qG   14GqG + 8BqG) qB +
+
 
8Bq
2
G + 8Gq
2
G

First, under the positivity of pB; the expression (4qH + 8GqH   14BqH + 4qG   14GqG + 8BqG)
is positive. It remains to analyse the concavity of the parabola, namely the sign of ((18G   7  14B)  + (18B   14G   7)).
Rename (18G   7  14B)  A and (18B   14G   7)  B with:
 A < 0 i¤ G < G where G  718 + 792
 B < 0 i¤ G > G where G  972   12 and G > G:
Solve A + B = 0 and denote the solution in  by    7+14G 18B7 18G+14B : This is a threshold on
 that is admissible and meaningful if it assumes values in the interval: 0 <  7+14G 18B7 18G+14B < 1:
Two scenarios may appear:
1. For A and B negative, i.e. for G < G < G, we have that  > 1: Hence, for G < G < G
and any value of  ; the parabola is concave.
2. For A positive and B negative, and for A negative and B positive, there may exist a threshold
value of the transportation cost for which the parabola is convex or concave.
Given    7+14G 18B7 18G+14B ; since  > 1 both for G < G and for G > G; the parabola is
always convex in the former case G < G; by contrast, in the latter case G > G the parabola is
always concave.
To conclude, for G < G; the whole parabola in (3) is positively signed, hence
@B(qB ;qG)
@qB
> 0:
Therefore, for this range of values of G; we have a corner solution with q

B = q
max
B ; being q
max
B the
20
highest achievable quality by the brown producer. In order to preserve the essence of a vertically
di¤erentiated duopoly, we assume that qmaxB < q

G:
Instead, for G > G; we nd that the parabola is positive for qB = 0 implying an interior
solution strictly smaller than qmaxB :
References
[1] Abbott A., Nandeibam S. and L. OShea (2013). Recycling: social norms and warmglow
revisited, Ecological Economics, 90, 10-18.
[2] Akerlof, G. (1997). Social distance and social decisions, Econometrica 65, 10051027.
[3] Alexopoulos, M. and S. Sapp (2006). Exploring the behavior of economic agents: the role of
relative preferences, Economics Bulletin 12(2), 17.
[4] Alpizar F. and E. Gsottbauer (2015). Reputation and household recycling practices: eld
experiments in Costa Rica, Ecological Economics, 120, 366-375.
[5] André, F. J., González, P., and N. Porteiro (2009). Strategic quality competition and the
Porter Hypothesis. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 57(2), 182-194.
[6] Antweiler, W., B.R. Copeland and M.S. Taylor (2001). Is Free Trade Good for the Environ-
ment?, American Economic Review, 91, 877-908.
[7] Baldwin, R., and J. Harrigan (2011). Zeros, quality, and space: Trade theory and trade evi-
dence, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 3(2), 60-88.
[8] Ben Elhadj N. and O. Tarola (2015). Relative quality (dis)utility in a vertically di¤erentiated
oligopoly with an environemntal externality, Environment and Development Economics, 20
(3), 349-373.
[9] Beshears, J., Choi, J. J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. C., and , K. L. Milkman (2015). The e¤ect
of providing peer information on retirement savings decisions, The Journal of Finance, 70(3),
1161-1201.
[10] Brekke, K.A., Kverndokk, S. and K. Nyborg (2003). An Economic Model of Moral Motivation,
Journal of Public Economics, 87 (9-10), 1967-1983.
[11] Brekke, K. A., Kipperberg, G., and K. Nyborg (2010). Social interaction in responsibility
ascription: the case of household recycling, Land Economics, 86(4), 766-784.
[12] Bursztyn, L., Ederer, F., Ferman, B., and N. Yuchtman (2014). Understanding mechanisms
underlying peer e¤ects: Evidence from a eld experiment on nancial decisions, Econometrica,
82(4), 1273-1301.
21
[13] Cabrales, A., and M. Motta (2001). Country asymmetries, endogenous product choice and the
timing of trade liberalization, European Economic Review, 45(1), 87-107.
[14] Carlsson, F., Garcia, J. and Å. Löfgren (2010). Conformity and the Demand for Environmental
Goods, Environmental and Resource Economics, 47 (3), 407-421.
[15] Cecere G., Mancinelli S. and M. Mazzanti (2014). Waste prevention and social preferences:
the role of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, Ecological Economics, 107, 163-176.
[16] Conrad K. (2005). Price Competition and Product Di¤erentiation When Consumers Care for
the Environment, Environmental and Resource Economics, 31 (1), 1-19.
[17] Copeland B.R. and M.R. Taylor (1994). NorthSouth trade and the environment, Quarterly
Journal of Economics 10, 755787
[18] Copeland B.R. and M.R. Taylor. (2003), Trade and the Environment: Theory and Evidence,
Princeton University Press.
[19] Czajkowski M., Hanley N.,and K. Nyborg (2015), Social norms, morals and selnterest as
determinants of pro-environmental behaviours: the case of household recycling, Environmental
and Resource Economics, DOI: 10.1007/s10640-015- 9964-3.
[20] Deltas, G., Harrington, D. R. and M. Khanna (2013). Oligopolies with (Somewhat) Environ-
mentally Conscious Consumers: Market Equilibrium and Regulatory Intervention, Journal of
Economics and Management Strategy, 22 (3), 640-667.
[21] Dietz, T., Fitzgerald, A., and R. Shwom (2005). Environmental Values, Annual Review of
Environment and Resources, 30, 335-372.
[22] Dohmen, T., A. Falk, K. Fliessbach, U. Sunde, and B. Weber (2011). Relative versus absolute
income, joy of winning, and gender: Brain imaging evidence. Journal of Public Economics
95(3), 279285.
[23] Dunlap R. and A. Metig (1995). Global concern for the environment: is a­ uence a prerequi-
site?, Journal of Social Issues, 51.
[24] Eriksson C. (2004). Can green consumerism replace environmental regulation? A di¤erentiated
product example. Resource and Energy Economics, 26, 281-293.
[25] European Commission (2013). Attitudes of europeans towards building the single market for
green products. Flash Eurobarometer 367.
[26] Fajgelbaum, P., Grossman, G. M., and E. Helpman (2011). Income Distribution, Product
Quality, and International Trade, Journal of Political Economy, 119(4), 721-765.
[27] Flam, H., and Helpman, E. (1987). Vertical product di¤erentiation and North-South trade,
American Economic Review, 810-822.
22
[28] Fliessbach, K., B. Weber, P. Trautner, T. J. Dohmen, U. Sunde, C. E. Elger, and A. Falk
(2007). Social comparison a¤ects reward-related brain activity in the human ventral striatum,
Science. 318.
[29] Gabszewicz, J. J., and Thisse, J. F. (1979). Price competition, quality and income disparities,
Journal of Economic Theory, 20(3), 340-359.
[30] Gabszewicz, J. J., M. Marini and S. Zanaj, (2017). Random encounters and information dif-
fusion about markets. CREA discussion papers, 2017-24.
[31] Garcìa-Gallego A. and Georgantizis N. (2009). Market E¤ect of Changes in Consumers Social
Responsibility, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 18(1), 235-262.
[32] Hage O., Soderholm P., Berglund C., (2009). Norms and economic motivation in household
recycling: empirical evidence for Sweden, Resources, Conservation and Recycling, 53, 155-165.
[33] Hallak, J. C., and Schott, P. K. (2011). Estimating cross-country di¤erences in product quality,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(1), 417-474.
[34] He¢ ner R., Kurani K.S. and Turrentine T.S. (2007). Symbolism in California: Early market
for Hybrid Electric Vehicles, Transportation Research Part D, 12, 396-413.
[35] Herguera, I., Kujal, P., and E. Petrakis (2000). Quantity restrictions and endogenous quality
choice, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18(8), 1259-1277.
[36] Hummels, D., and P. J. Klenow (2005). The variety and quality of a nations exports, American
Economic Review, 95(3), 704-723.
[37] Khandelwal, A. (2010). The long and short (of) quality ladders, The Review of Economic
Studies, 77(4), 1450-1476.
[38] Krugman, P. R. (1989). Industrial organization and international trade. Handbook of industrial
organization, 2, 1179-1223.
[39] Linder, S. B. (1961). An essay on trade and transformation. Wiley.
[40] Litina A., Moriconi S. and S. Zanaj (2016). The Cultural Transmission of Environmental Value:
A Comparative Approach, World Development, 84(C), 131-148.
[41] Lombardini-Riipinen C. (2005). Optimal Tax Policy under Environmental Quality Competition
Environmental and Resource Economics, 32 (3), 317-336.
[42] Mantovani, A., Tarola, O., and C. Vergari (2017). End-of-pipe or cleaner production? How to
go green in presence of income inequality and pro-environmental behavior, Journal of Cleaner
Production, (160), 71-82.
23
[43] Moraga-Gonzalez, J. L. and N. Padron-Fumero (2002). Environmental Policy in a Green Mar-
ket, Environmental and Resource Economics, 22 (3), pp. 419447.
[44] Motta, M. and Thisse, J. F. (1993). Minimum Quality Standard as an Environmental Policy:
Home country and International E¤ects. Nota di Lavoro 20, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
[45] Murphy, K. M., and Shleifer, A. (1997). Quality and trade, Journal of Development Economics,
53(1), 1-15.
[46] Mussa, M., and S. Rosen (1978). Monopoly and product quality, Journal of Economic Theory,
18(2), 301-317.
[47] Nyborg, K., Howarth R.B. and K.A. Brekke (2006). Green Consumers and Public Policy: On
Socially Contingent Moral Motivation, Resource and Energy Economics, 28 (4), pp. 351-366
[48] Ostrom, E. (2000). Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 14 (3), pp. 137-158.
[49] Owen, A.L. and J. Videras (2006). Civic cooperation, proenvironment attitudes, and behavioral
intentions, Ecological Economics, 58 (4), pp. 814-829.
[50] Owen A. L. and J. R. Videras (2007). Culture and public goods: the case of religion and
the voluntary provision of environmental quality, Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 54, 162-180.
[51] Picard P. M. and A. Tampieri (2016). Income E¤ects and Vertical Di¤erentiation in Interna-
tional Trade, CREA Discussion Paper Series 16-05, Center for Research in Economic Analysis,
University of Luxembourg.
[52] Riechmann, T. (2006). Mixed motives in a Cournot game, Economics Bulletin 4(29), 18.
[53] Rodriguez-Ibeas R. (2007). Environmental Product di¤erentiation and Environmental Aware-
ness, Environmental and Resource Economics 36, 237-254.
[54] Sanin, M. E., and S. Zanaj (2011). A note on clean technology adoption and its inuence on
tradeable emission permits prices, Environmental and Resource Economics, 48(4), 561-567.
[55] Schünemann J and T. Trimborn (2017). "Boosting taxes for boasting about houses: Status
concerns in the housing market," ECON WPS - Vienna University of Technology Working
Papers in Economic Theory and Policy 05/2017, Vienna University of Technology, Institute
for Mathematical Methods in Economics, Research Group Economics (ECON).
[56] Sexton, S. E., and A. L Sexton (2014). Conspicuous conservation: The Prius halo and willing-
ness to pay for environmental bona des, Journal of Environmental Economics and Manage-
ment, 67(3), 303-317.
24
[57] Steg, L., and J. I. M. de Groot (2012). Environmental values. In S. Clayton (Ed.), The Ox-
ford Handbook of Environmental and Conservation Psychology (81-92). New York: Oxford
University Press.
[58] Stern P.C. (2000). Toward a Coherent Theory of Environmentally Signicant Behavior, Journal
of Social Issues , 56 (3), 407-424.
[59] Torgler B. and García-Valiµnas (2007), The determinants of individualsattitudes towards pre-
venting environmental damage, Ecological Economics, 63, 536-552.
[60] Van den Bergh J.C.J.M., (2008), Environmental regulation of households: an empirical review
of economic and psychological factors, Ecological Economics, 66, 559-574.
[61] Veblen, T. (1899). Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study in the Evolution of
Institutions. New York: Macmillan.
[62] Verhoogen, E. A. (2008). Trade, quality upgrading, and wage inequality in the Mexican man-
ufacturing sector, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(2), 489-530.
[63] Videras, J., Owen, A. L., Conover, E., and S. Wu (2012). The inuence of social relationships
on pro-environment behaviors, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 63(1),
35-50.
[64] Welsch, H., and J. Kühling (2009). Determinants of pro-environmental consumption: The role
of reference groups and routine behavior, Ecological Economics, 69(1), 166-176.
25
